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**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

IMPACTS OF PROLONGED PEACE ON BRAZILIAN POLITICS

by

Ugur GUNGOR

December 2005

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Thomas Bruneau
Harold Trinkunas

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The purpose of the thesis is to find out how prolonged peace affects the politics and national goals of countries. Peace has become one of the major study areas in both international and domestic politics. The relationship between war making efforts and increasing the state capacity has been examined in the cases of developed countries, especially in Europe in the twentieth century. However, the findings of such studies are not all applicable for the developing countries in the Third World, and the relation between the interstate peace and the state capacity of countries has not been analyzed in depth. Finding out the effects of regional peace on contemporary Brazilian politics is valuable to understand the course of international relations with the absence of a clear threat of international war. This is becoming increasingly true of other important regions of the world, such as the European Union, Southern Africa, and the former Soviet states, where major interstate war seems unlikely. Moreover explaining more cooperative foreign policies, the priority of economic wealth generation in domestic affairs, and the institutional changes, especially in the military, in the case of Brazil will be helpful in a comparative perspective to understand countries that will be experiencing similar environments.

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IMPACTS OF PROLONGED PEACE ON BRAZILIAN POLITICS

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of the thesis is to find out how prolonged peace affects the politics and national goals of countries. Peace has become one of the major study areas in both international and domestic politics. The relationship between war making efforts and increasing the state capacity has been examined in the cases of developed countries, especially in Europe in the twentieth century. However, the findings of such studies are not all applicable for the developing countries in the Third World, and the relation between the interstate peace and the state capacity of countries has not been analyzed in depth. Finding out the effects of regional peace on Brazilian contemporary politics is valuable to understand the course of international relations with the absence of a clear threat of international war. This is becoming increasingly true of other important regions of the world, such as the European Union, Southern Africa, and the former Soviet states, where major interstate war seems unlikely. Moreover explaining more cooperative foreign policies, the priority of economic wealth generation in domestic affairs, and the institutional changes, especially in the military, in the case of Brazil will be helpful in a comparative perspective to understand countries that will be experiencing similar environments.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. ARGUMENT OF THE THESIS

1. Purpose and Importance

The purpose of the thesis is to find out how prolonged peace affects the politics and national goals of countries. Peace has become one of the major study areas in both international and domestic politics. Some scholars like Charles Tilly find a strong correlation between war making and state capacity of the developed countries. However, what is the relationship between peace and state capacity in developing countries that lack external threats?

Finding out the effects of regional peace on Brazilian contemporary politics is valuable when trying to understand the course of international relations while there is an absence of a clear threat of international war. This is becoming increasingly true of other important regions of the world, such as the European Union, Southern Africa, and the former Soviet states, where major interstate war seems unlikely. Moreover, explaining more cooperative foreign policies, the priority of having economic wealth generation within domestic affairs, and the institutional changes within the military, will be helpful when trying to build a comparative perspective to understand countries that will be experiencing similar environments.

2. Hypothesis

My hypothesis is that the peaceful environment, or the absence of high external threats, has affected the state, society, military, and individual leaders in Brazil. How does the international peace or the absence of a clear external threat in South America affect Brazil's achievement of national goals? I hypothesize that the absence of a serious external threat in the region pushed Brazil to become more cooperative in the international realm, to prioritize economic development, and to institutionalize accordingly. Brazil's national goal of greatness in world politics could not be pursued vigorously due to the lack of the necessary conditions for successful strategies within the region.

My analyses will examine the state capacity and development of Brazil in comparison with other developing countries. I will try to match the national goals and policy objectives of Brazil with the outcome of domestic and foreign policies influenced by the level of the external threats in the environment.

3. Methodology

The effects of regional peace on the politics of a country, specifically Brazil, will be examined within the three levels of analysis: systemic, domestic, and institutional. The comparison of the military rule between 1964 and 1985 and the civilian regime after 1985 will be the focus of this thesis which is intended to extract the impacts of peace or the mere absence of high external threats.

The introductory chapter will discuss the theoretical review of basic concepts such as “zone of peace” arguments and Latin American peace at the system level, national security strategies and threat perceptions at the domestic level, diplomacy used as a foreign policy tool for advancing national interests in a systemic perspective, and the domestic implications of peace and civil-military relations will be conceptualized in this chapter.

Following the same methodology, chapters two and three will analyze Latin American security environment, military and elite threat perceptions, national security strategies, use of diplomacy in foreign policies, and civil-military relations in the given periods. The second chapter examines 21 years of military regime through the perceptual threats and political responses to these threats. The third chapter discusses the democratic transition and civilian authority through the primacy of economic and social development strategies under the obvious lack of external threats.

In the concluding chapter, the impact of peace through a comparison of politics within the military regime and civilian governments will be assessed. Three aspects will be analyzed within Brazil on the systemic and domestic levels; threat perceptions and national security strategies, diplomacy in foreign policies, and civil-military relations in domestic politics. The final chapter will also focus on Brazil’s regional and global roles in the future in terms of military and defense strategies.

B. ZONE OF PEACE AND SOUTH AMERICAN PEACE

1. Interstate Peace and Zone of Peace

Prolonged peace is the starting point of my thesis; therefore, it is necessary to define it as the main variable of my analysis. The definitions and the typologies of peace set the conditional factors for the causal relationship between a peaceful environment and state capacity through state policies.

The definition of international war and peace may vary according to some dimensions such as strength, time span, geographical scope, or the nature of threats. In the literature we find definitions such as “zones of war”, “no-war zones”, and “zones of peace” in respect to geographical places, or as “cold war,” “hot war,” or “cold peace” in respect to the intensity and quality of the interstate relations.

War zones are defined as regions where there is high occurrence of actual interstate wars. In no-war zones, militarized conflicts are frequent, military capabilities are targeted toward specified enemies, and alliances and arms races may be prominent features of the diplomatic and strategic landscape. Never the less, war does not result from these processes. However in zones of peace, militarized conflicts may break out too, but capabilities are not targeted toward members of the region and war becomes unthinkable in bilateral relations.¹

Kacowicz's definition states, “a zone of peace is a discrete geographical region of the world in which a group of states have maintained peaceful relations among themselves for a period of at least thirty years, a generation, though civil wars, domestic unrest, and violence might still occur within their borders, as well as international conflicts and crises between them.”² Kacowicz divides the peace patterns into three types. The first type is “negative peace”, or the mere absence of war. The second type of peace is “stable peace”, that is, no expectations of interstate violence in the region. The third type is a “pluralistic security community of nations”, in which member states share common norms and are deeply interdependent.

¹ Kalevi J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 147.

² Arie M. Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace In The Third World: South America and West Africa In Comparative Perspective* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 12.

M. Arie Kacowicz, in his prominent book about zones of peace in the Third World, argues that to achieve a substantive, more stable peace within a region, two conditions must exist: satisfaction with the territorial status quo and a shared norm for peaceful settlement of international conflicts. To move beyond a stable peace toward a pluralistic security community, high levels of interdependence and economic integration among the states and the people with a sense of regional identity are necessary conditions.³

2. South American Peace

David Mares articulates the existence of “violent peace” in Latin America, opposed to the “zone of peace” assessments of authors like Arie Kacowicz and Holsti. According to his perspective, international affairs are all about bargaining situations between rational actors. Latin America is not an exception to this reality. In contrast to the widespread perception of having prolonged peace, Mares finds the historical record of “militarized interstate disputes” in the region, including conflicts with less than 1000 casualties, enough to change the peaceful outlook of Latin America. The potential militarized disputes among countries, which are not yet satisfied with their territorial status quos, are given as indicators of interstate competition. He proposes the “interstate militarized bargaining model” against the actual cooperative intentions of state actors, where the decision-makers “weigh the costs of militarized conflict against their constituents’ willingness to accept the costs.”⁴ Although refuting the “democratic peace” arguments, Mares argues that the main reason for decision makers to use or not use the military force in interstate relations is the constituent affect on their authorities. However, he also makes the argument that the military regimes of 1960s and 1970s did not use military forces despite their autonomy from the constituents.

With the records of militarized crises, targeted military forces, diplomatic ruptures, and overall military competitiveness, South America clearly is not yet a zone of peace. It has been a no-war zone in which the probabilities of armed conflict are

³ Kacowicz 1998, 24.

⁴ David R. Mares, *Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America* (Colombia University Press, New York, 2001), 3.

substantially lower than many other regions of the world today.⁵ Within South America, since 1903, there have only been two wars: the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay (1932-1935) and the war between Ecuador and Peru (1995). A war is defined only if there are more than 1,000 casualties.⁶ The twentieth century map of South America displays no major change in the territories. In the region, especially after the Second World War, most of the states accept the territorial status quo and share a normative consensus.⁷

South America is now moving from a negative zone of peace toward a more stable one. Even authors who focus on militarized disputes among states in Latin America, such as David Mares, would probably acknowledge that the region is characterized by the absence of major regional wars in the twentieth century. This thesis will focus on Brazil, the most important regional actor, yet a country which has not fought a war with its neighbors in 135 years and whose troops have not served in combat since they fought with the Allies in World War II.

C. PERCEPTUAL THREATS AND BRAZIL'S PERCEPTIONS

1. Threat Perceptions and National Security Strategies

The definition of threat that will be used as a variable in the thesis is the systemic threat on the interstate level that is posed to the state and the society. Under all circumstances, a threat is something conditional, potential, or hypothetical, and the threat perception comes from the assessment of past, present, and future vulnerabilities of the state and the society. While all perception is ultimately the act of individuals, threat perception as a task of statecraft takes place in collective groups, especially in organizations.⁸

If a state actor feels threatened, he anticipates the loss of something of value, such as territory, population, sovereignty, economic assets, and political constitution. The threatening action may appear alongside military violence as economic, ideological, or

5 Holsti 1996, 154.

6 Ibid., 151.

7 Ibid., 9-10.

8 Ibid., 114.

politically subversive. Even though the source of threat is not real or tangible, the act of threat perception creates an image of reality. The changing nature of international relations and the inadequacy of information about the future may be the downside of these perceptual threats.⁹ Moreover, threat perception can become stereotyped as a result of historical experience.

Misperception is a common dimension of threat perception, which can be either deliberate or erroneous. Deliberate misperception is like a manufactured or purposive evaluation of a nonexistent threat designed to justify and excuse some policies, which require the existence of a threat. However, the erroneous threat perception, which tends to exaggerate or miscalculate the intentions and realities, in most cases is more common than the previous one.¹⁰

The political outcome of the threat perception of policy makers in a state frames the national security strategy. National security is an elastic and flexible term that can be stretched to cover different issues and activities over time. Basically, it is protecting the territory and the people of a nation against external and internal physical assaults which is narrowly equivalent to defense.¹¹

National security refers to the condition of a nation's safety from internal and external threats. A greater emphasis is put on external threats to ensure the protection of vital economic and political interests. The survival and safety of the nation-state is possible throughout the use of economic and military power and the exercise of diplomacy in both peace and war. Moreover, the foreign policy and domestic policies have some overlapping spheres with national security policies of the states.

2. Threat Perception in Brazil

The ruling elite in Brazil, during the military regime, relied heavily on **geopolitical thinking** when assessing the potential threats to national security. In a very generic term, the external threat perceptions have been limited to border and territorial

⁹ Klaus Eugen Knorr, *Historical dimensions of national security problems* (University Press of Kansas, 1976), 84.

¹⁰ Ibid., 120.

¹¹ Jordan Amos, William J. Taylor Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb, *American National Security: Policy and Process*, 4th ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 3.

disputes.¹² Therefore, the examination of the geopolitical thinking of the leaders is essential in gaining a better understanding of the threat perceptions in Brazil especially during the military regime.

Philip Kelly and Jack Child define geopolitics as the impact of geographic features on foreign and security policies.¹³ Jack Child emphasizes the importance of geopolitics in Brazilian history and the region. During 1960s and 1980s, geopolitical strategic perspectives had dominated the region, where Brazil had played a leading role in this kind of thinking. This mindset dominated national security attitudes and foreign policy objectives for years.

The Brazilian geopolitical school was without a doubt the most significant in Latin America. This is true not only because of its impact on contemporary Brazil, but also because it has served as a model for others and has produced strongly reactive geopolitical thinking¹⁴

In respect to the geopolitical considerations, Brazil is a dominant power in South America and the South Atlantic. It has common borders with all South American states except Chile and Ecuador. Its maritime frontier extends to Africa, and it is the fifth largest country in the world. Its population is larger than the rest of South America combined. With all these aspects in mind, the leaders of Brazil have always believed that Brazil is a potential rising world power.

The era of democratization, after authoritarian Brazil, witnessed the priority of economic and social development in the minds of ruling elites. Communism as a subversive ideology, Soviet intervention or US interference to Brazilian sovereignty, and even the long lasting rivalry with Argentina were no longer a threat to the civilians. Economic crises, social inequality, organizational crime, penetration of the Amazon Region, and economic dependency have become the issues of national security in the 1990s.

12 G. Pope Atkins, *Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System* (Westview Press, Texas, 1999), 62.

13 Philip Kelly and Jack Child, *Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica* (Lynne Reinner Publishers, Colorado, 1988), 2.

14 Ibid., 34.

D. FOREIGN POLICY TOOLS AND DIPLOMACY IN BRAZIL

1. Tools of Statecraft in Foreign Affairs

Another variable of analysis is the policy outcomes of the peaceful environment in Brazil. Therefore, it is meaningful to define the major influence strategies of foreign policy. The tools of international interaction can be multiple and diverse according to the state actor and the international context. However, we can identify some typologies for the main instruments of statecraft: diplomacy, economic instruments, information programs, clandestine actions, threats of force, and use of force.¹⁵ Among these strategies, I will focus on diplomatic and economic instruments as the primary means of statecraft.

Diplomacy is the primary and the most common form of interstate relations, which also has variations in itself such as cooperative, mediating, or coercive diplomacy. Diplomacy involves negotiations, settlement of disputes, representation, and social functions. If we analyze the foreign policies of a state within two major procedural stages, the making and the implementation of policy, diplomacy is used as an instrument through which decisions are implemented, policy activated and achieved.¹⁶

Economic instruments are also functional as they have become the key factor in today's globalized world with high interdependence among state actors. It is mainly referred as the carrot and stick phenomenon in politics such as economic sanctions and positive incentives.

Information programs are also gaining importance as the global communication instruments are reaching every corner of the world. It is sometimes perceived as the power of propaganda through public information, namely the media. However, clandestine actions, which include espionage, subversion, sabotage, or assassination in some extreme cases, are often risky for the doer. Sometimes it is referred to the last resort other than war when diplomacy or economic instruments, as well as information

15 R. Allan Ricketts and Richard J. Norton, *National security* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1994), 42.

16 Brian White "Diplomacy," in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford University Press, 2001) 123.

programs, do not work. Similarly, the threat of force is not an ordinary way to deal with sovereign states and it is only used when the risk of escalation is present.

The final instrument that we can easily identify is the oldest way of obtaining national interests which is the use of force. It is perceived as the last resort or the ultimate form of state instruments to deal with an international issue affecting the country's national security. However, it is not only deteriorating for democracy and human rights, but also distressing in terms of economic calculations.

2. Brazilian Diplomacy and Foreign Relations

Brazil has always been well known for its successful diplomatic legacy. Rather than relying on military dominance in international relations, Brazil prefers to use diplomacy, which is safer and more cost-effective in most cases. While analyzing the foreign policy of Brazil since 1964, it is necessary to mention Brazil's reputation for using diplomacy extensively in interstate relations.

Brazil used diplomacy, negotiation, and bargaining methods more in its bilateral foreign relations, especially with its neighbor Argentina, and in multilateral issues in the region. It is fair to say that Brazil, in favor of mediation and negotiation, has developed a diplomatic culture based on the peaceful resolution of disputes.¹⁷

Although geopolitical thinking had limited the external threat perceptions to border security and territorial disputes in authoritarian Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s, diplomacy was still the main policy tool. The military mind has been replaced gradually with domestic, economic, and social prerogatives in the contemporary strategic guidance of Brazil as a developing country.¹⁸ Pope Atkins stresses that since WWII, in most Latin American countries, national security has been synonymous with national development, where the new agendas are democratization, economic reforms, civil-mil relations, and regional integration.¹⁹

¹⁷ Wayne A. Selcher, "Current Dynamics and Future Prospects of Brazil's Relations with Latin America: Toward a Pattern of Bilateral Cooperation," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1986), 70

¹⁸ Atkins 1999, 63.

¹⁹ Ibid., 53.

E. DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS OF PEACE

1. Impacts of External Threat and Peace

Tilly finds a strong relationship between war making and state building as seen in his famous statement: “war makes states and states make war.”²⁰ Charles Tilly’s argument on war and state relationship, mainly examining the European cases, concludes that war-making efforts, due to the existence of external threats, increased states’ scope and cohesion. For Tilly, the lack of external threats might undermine the state capacity of the developing countries.

In addition to the war and state arguments, with the rise of democratic civil-military relations literature, scholars began to examine the impacts of the external threat environment on domestic politics. Desch argues that external threats improve political control of the armed forces. He claims that existence of external threats draws the attention of civilians to the armed forces and therefore facilitates civilian control of the military.²¹ Nevertheless, another situation is also possible: the existence of significant threats to the national security can make the armed forces a privileged institution, and raise their domestic significance and influence.

There are arguments about the impact of change in domestic politics on international relations of countries such as transition to democracy and the end of military regimes. However, they should be analyzed in both ways to understand the affects of the changing international realm on individual countries. Domestic affairs affect the international relations, whereas the international environment influences the domestic realm.

A peaceful international environment, or the absence of a concrete external threat, will have impacts on the society, state, military and the individual leaders in a democratic environment. The society has the power of electing governments and, in most cases, has power through what it thinks. The state institutions and state bureaucracy will also reflect their preferences in the absence of external security concerns, where they will focus on

20 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169.

21 Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 13-14.

other issues such as human rights, democratization, etc. Moreover, the individual actors, especially those who contribute to the decision making process, are affected by the international threat perceptions of the country. The elected leaders and government officials may prioritize economic and social development, while they lack the expertise in security issues. The peaceful international context will be reflected in national security strategies and threat perceptions and will have positive effects on democratization process as public participation in politics, economic development, and social welfare.

However, it is also argued that the absence of external war might adversely affect the military as an institution in a democracy. The argument is that the lack of tangible external security concerns will push the military into an internal role that does not always favor democracy, therefore pushing civil-military relations into a new composition.²²

2. Civil-Military Relations

The main indicator of the relation between the external threat environment and the domestic realm is the state of civil-military relations (CMR) of a country under a democratic regime. Today, civilian control of the military, namely military compliance with government authority, is one of the basics of democratic rule. Civilian control is measured by the authority of the government officials to make decisions concerning the military, e.g., missions, organization, and employment, and state policies, free from military interference.

Civil-military relations are defined as “the entire range of relationships between the military and society at every level”²³ My analysis will focus on the causal relationship between the external threat environment and the reflections in the civil military relations mainly in the political-military dimension. The security environment and the threat scenario, missions and tasks of the military, social forces and ideologies, and the power relations among the political institutions are the subject terms of our CMR analysis of Brazil.

The basic causal relationship between the threat environment and CMR can be summarized in Desch’s argument. Michael Desch examines the civilian control of the

22 Desch 1999, 13.

23 Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” *Annual Review Political Science* (1999, 2): 211.

armed forces in democracies and defines CMR in terms of the relative distribution of power between the government and the armed forces of a country. He illustrates the impacts of the threat environments on the level of CMR of countries: “the lack of a serious external threat leads to deteriorating CMR.”²⁴ Charles Moskos, in his book about modern militaries in the changing international threat environment, also gives the logic behind the domestic and foreign policies of countries.²⁵ He points out that the military should focus on the external threat and tasks, because internal tasks may deteriorate the political impartiality of the military. This is very important for the legitimacy of military in the society.

The traditional role of the military is to be ready for an external threat, and Brazilian military tried to increase its power through a developed defense industry and assuring the primacy of national security issues in state politics. However, the civilians who want the priority to be economic welfare rather than unlikely security threats are now questioning the security concerns of the military mind in Brazil. Moreover, the internal missions and tasks of the military have increased in Brazil, in the last half of the twentieth century. The argument is that the prolonged peace over a hundred years made the military engage in internal affairs. However, recently, Brazilian military has employed and supported foreign policy through peaceful deployments abroad, such as peacekeeping.

24 Desch 1999, 13.

25 Charles C. Moskos, *The Postmodern Military* (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000), 27.

II. MILITARY RULE (1964-1985)

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will focus on the Brazilian military regime from 1964 to 1985, in order to examine the implications of prolonged peace on Brazilian politics in the system and domestic levels of analysis. The chapter focuses on four main parts during these 20 years of military governments. In the first part, the focus will be on the security environment within Latin America, and the “armed peace” argument will be discussed. The existing threat and security environment for the region, particularly for Brazil, and the historical background for the authoritarian regime in Brazil during the period of 1964-85 will be examined at the system level of analysis. In the second part, the military threat perceptions and national security strategy will be focused on in addition to the environment in the domestic level. The rivalry with Argentina and the threat of communist subversion are the main threats for the military leaders during this period. In the third part, the foreign policies of the military governments between 1964 and 1985 will be examined, especially through diplomatic relations abroad. Finally, in the fourth part of the chapter, the domestic implications of external peace will be analyzed, where the evolution of civil-military relations is taken as the major indicator of domestic politics. The roles for Brazilian military driven by the threat perception will also be discussed in this chapter.

B. LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY IN AUTHORITARIAN BRAZIL

In terms of total international wars since 1816, the start date for quantitative studies of war, Latin America is not exceptionally peaceful. Latin America and specifically the Southern Cone, before the twentieth century, was a region of conflict. However, for South America, the twentieth century has been an era of relative peace, when compared to the record of war in the nineteenth-century.²⁶

Grabendorff states that there had been 23 internal conflicts in Latin America between 1945 and 1976, which refutes the existence of an inherent peace in domestic

26 Holsti 1996, 23.

terms.²⁷ However, there have been no wars of secession, and within the interstate level, there has been no wars between South American states since 1941. Since 1903, there has been two wars in South America: the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay (1932–1935), and the war between Ecuador and Peru in 1941. Moreover, most of the conflicts which broke out in this region during the twentieth century were limited in time and diplomatic action was instituted as much as force. South America has been the most peaceful area in the world in the twentieth century. Other areas of the world have been scenes of more or less chronic warfare and armed intervention.²⁸

In South America, during the authoritarian military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s, one of the main reasons for the lack of interstate conflict was due to the internal orientation of threat perceptions. The military governments formulated doctrines of national security, relying upon anticomunist stereotypes of the Cold War, and they adjusted the doctrine to their own realities and purposes. The national security and foreign policy thinking of the military regimes were mistrustful and competitive in nature. In North America and Europe, theoreticians of national security stressed total war and nuclear weapons strategy and focused on the use of limited warfare. In contrast, their South American counterparts emphasized the threats of internal subversion and revolutionary warfare.²⁹

1. Security Environment for Authoritarian Brazil

The Cold War period affected the external environments of countries throughout the world. Countries were heavily influenced by the bipolar conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, despite the ideological challenges in its internal politics, Brazil was largely unaffected by external threats from the Soviet Union and the United States. The likelihood of any interstate-armed conflict was very low and regional integration and security cooperation were becoming an increasing trend.

The real security environment around Brazil, similar to other countries in South America, was lacking a serious, tangible, external threat during the authoritarian rule of

27 Wolf Grabendorff, “Interstate Conflict Behavior and Regional Potential for Conflict in Latin America,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* Vol. 24, No. 3. (Aug., 1982): 271.

28 Kacowicz 1998, 68.

29 Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle* (Oxford University Press, NY, 2000), 201.

1964-85. Communism and the nuclear rivalry with Argentina were the major external sources of insecurity; these factors were in fact of less priority when compared to the economic development of the country. Brazil has enjoyed generally good relations with its neighbors, except the rivalry with Argentina up to the mid-1980s. The politically inspired terrorism of the late 1960s and 1970s was the only organized internal insurgency, which was less severe than its equivalents in other states. The pacific security environment for Brazil became more obvious with the disarmament negotiations to end the chronic rivalry with Argentina in early 1980s. The economic boom during the mid 1970s and reduction of the defense budget were clear indicators of how the military governments were shifting their focus to areas other than the traditional security concerns.

2. Military Legacy and the Preconditions of 1964

In almost 500 years of its existence, Brazil has not experienced a high frequency of armed conflicts. For the last 135 years, Brazil has not been involved in an interstate conflict in the region. This rare historical legacy of prolonged peace has enhanced the evolution of a peace-oriented defense mentality in Brazil and kept the armed forces relatively small.³⁰

Brazil has participated in three international wars since its independence from Portugal in 1822. The first conflict occurred in the early 1850s in the Rio de la Plata basin, the site of a long-time rivalry among Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil.³¹ The second war was against Paraguay and allies Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay for five years between 1865 and 1870. In the aftermath of the war, the territory that Brazil and Argentina had gained control of became the subject of their rivalry for regional power and influence. The third international war Brazilians participated in was WWII. Under an agreement reached between the United States government and Getulio Vargas, Brazil sent an expeditionary force to Italy in July 1944.³²

30 Edmundo Sussumu Fujita, "The Brazilian Policy of Sustainable Defense," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 74, No. 3 (Jul. 1998), 577.

31 Thomas Skidmore and Peter Smith, *Modern Latin America* (Oxford University Press, 1997), 152.

32 Ibid., 152.

The Brazilian armed forces have developed in response to different external threats in history. The army was strengthened during the Dutch invasions of the seventeenth century. The Brazilian Navy flourished during the war of independence in the nineteenth century. Finally, the air force was founded during the Second World War.³³ Through professional military education under the guidance of German and French professionals, the military became more involved in politics in Brazil, especially after 1930.

The social, economic, and ideological problems that were present in many parts of the world during the 1960s involved Brazil as well. The military had intervened into politics five times since 1930 and served as a moderator instead of taking direct military control. However, in 1964, the military assumed governance to the full extent. As Alfred Stepan has noted, “the military became the director and not the moderator of politics. Instead of maintaining the status quo, the military sought to transform the system.”³⁴

With a large popular support, Janio Quadros became the president of Brazil in 1960. Quadros initiated negotiations with the Soviet Union and other communist bloc nations. These negotiations increased Soviet influence within Brazil and greatly displeased the United States. Moreover, Quadros’ new tax plan also disturbed the businessmen and conservative elites in Brazil. After only eight months of presidency, the military forced him to resign.³⁵

Quadros’ vice-president, Joao Goulart, assumed the presidency after him despite opposition from the military. During his presidency, Goulart supported some land reforms and tried to restrict the money flow going out of Brazil. He also extended suffrage to include illiterates and allowed communists to participate in Brazilian politics. The disapproval of wealthy landowners, industrialists, and the external pressure from the U.S. led to Brazilian military intervention within the political scene and the eventual overthrow of Goulart’s government in 1964.³⁶

33 Fujita 1998, 577.

34 Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1971), 134.

35 Thomas E. Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85* (Oxford University Press, NY, 1988), 8.

36 Ibid., 16.

3. Military Governments

The Brazilian Generals seized power with promises to reinforce the threatened democratic institutions and eliminate the danger of subversion and communism. Soon after they took power, using the “National Security Doctrine” as an ideological blueprint, the military reshaped governmental structures and created new organizations that emphasized central planning and control over the entire state administration. Institutional Act No.1, right after the coup, centralized political authority, eliminated parliamentary immunity, and launched inquiries into suspected individuals.³⁷

From 1964 to 1985, the military dominated the regime in Brazil. The presidents and the governors were imposed by the armed forces, where a submissive Congress was forced to approve them. The first president with a military background was Humberto Castelo Branco (1964-67). Branco did not want to undermine the constitutional order and intended to stay in power for a short time to maintain the necessary security. However, his term was extended for one year with extra decrees and the hard-liners within the military were able to secure the continuation of the authoritarian rule despite Branco’s initial commitments.³⁸

A power struggle took place within the military from the very beginning of the military governance. In late 1965 and early 1966, the moderate faction represented by General Castelo Branco lost their influence over the hard-line officers clustered around the Minister of Army Arthur da Costa e Silva. The pro-ESG members of the military, the so-called Sorbonnists, were politically moderate and wanted to maintain democratic forms and institutions. Presidents Castelo Branco (1964-1967) and Geisel (1974-79) best represented this faction. In contrast, the hard-liners within the military favored suspension of democratic processes and were more nationalistic. They argued against a high degree of foreign political and economic dependence in attaining the goals of security and development. The hard-liners were hesitant to return political power to civilians. Presidents Costa e Silva (1967-69) and Medici (1969-74) best represented this faction within the military.³⁹

37 Skidmore 1988, 8.

38 Ibid., 18.

39 Ibid., 105.

After Castelo's term, Artur da Costa e Silva (1967-69) assumed the presidency supported by the hard-liners within the military. However, he died unexpectedly in 1969 before his term ended. The officer corps elected Emilio Garrastazu Medici (1969-74). Like Costa e Silva, Medici was also supporting the hard-line measures and holding the authority as long as it was necessary to make Brazil a great power. The Medici years witnessed increasing insurgency within cities, which included the kidnappings of diplomats and ambassadors.

Ernesto Geisel (1974-79) was the next general to be the president in authoritarian Brazil. Geisel signaled the first steps of relaxation from authoritarian rule in Brazil. Finally, the last president of the military regime was Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo (1979-85). He claimed that he took over the presidency more out of a sense of duty than political ambition. Political liberalization and the declining world economy contributed to Brazil's economic and social problems. In 1978 and 1980, huge strikes took place in the industrial ring around Sao Paulo.⁴⁰ The democratic transition became almost inevitable for Brazil in the early 1980s and the authoritarian regime initiated the negotiations to resign the 20-year military rule. In the bargaining process with the civilians, the military tried to maintain its autonomy and power sources such as intelligence, control of the defense industry, and constitutional mission to protect the state.

C. THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Miguel Angel Centeno argues that most Latin American countries have lacked the influence of an external enemy that would have encouraged the development and solidification of a national identity. The enemy was perceived not as the nation next door, but as those in the population who threatened the social and economic status quo. Except some stereotype concerns about the neighboring countries, which were all probabilistic, and not imminent, the military regime did not deal with external threats as an important issue throughout their time of control.⁴¹

The Brazilian military in the 1960s and 1970s was both internally and externally oriented, during this period the threat perceptions of the military regime regarding the

40 Skidmore 1988, 212.

41 Miguel Angel Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and Nation-State in Latin America* (The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pa., 2002), 62.

external environment were mainly derived from the teachings of the Brazilian War College Escola Superior de Guerra. ESG was established in 1949, and in 1963, its charter decreed its mission as, “preparing civilians and military to perform executive and advisory functions especially in those organs responsible for the formulation, development, planning, and execution of the politics of national security.”⁴² The geopolitical security thinking and the interrelationships between national security and national development were the dominant ideology of the ESG in 1960s. The generals began developing ideas that stressed the possibility of an “indirect attack” from the Soviet Union such as subversion.⁴³ In accordance with the military strategists, the military governments emphasized the external sources trying to penetrate Brazil and they followed more of internally oriented political pattern.

External threat perception of the military governments could be seen in the military journals of that time. In December 1975, the navy minister, Azevedo Henning emphasized the dangers of Soviet military expansionism in the South Atlantic. In 1976, an article in the Brazilian Army War College’s journal discussed two types of threats: “ideological penetration via diplomatic and commercial means in peace time and the transformation of countries in Brazil’s strategic realm such as Angola into a communist state will be disadvantageous for Brazil in war time.”⁴⁴ Alfred Stepan takes the military periodicals as one of the main sources of his evaluation of the military doctrine in authoritarian Brazil, where he finds a doctrinal change between 1974 and 1981. Political participation, opposition, and elections for the civil society began to be considered more a part of national security.⁴⁵

1. Argentine Rivalry

For the military regime, one of the greatest concerns about external threats was the aggressiveness of Argentina towards Brazil. The perceptions regarding the Argentine

42 Stepan 1971, 176.

43 Philip L. Kelly, “Geopolitical Themes in the Writings of General Carlos de Meira Mattos of Brazil,” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2, (Nov. 1984), 447.

44 Andrew Hurrell, “The Politics of South Atlantic Security: A survey of Proposals for a South Atlantic Treaty Organization,” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* Vol. 59, no.2 (1983), 185.

45 Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton University Press, 1988), 48-49.

aim to isolate Brazil had originated from the very end of the colonial period and had been remarkably consistent. Brazil declared war on Argentina over the territory of present day Uruguay in 1825 and the control of the Rio de la Plata had become the source of the conflict between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay from 1825 to 1851. They waged wars almost continuously to control this economically important area.⁴⁶

The threat perception of the military about Argentina was constant throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The rivalry reached to the highest level in the late 1970s when both countries decided to acquire nuclear technology. Argentina's agreement with India for nuclear programs increased the threat perceptions in Brazil. Brazil then signed an agreement with West Germany to produce nuclear reactors in 1975, this agreement eventually ended up as being secret nuclear programs conducted by the military.⁴⁷

3. National Security and Defense Under Military Threat Perception

The military regime was guided by a national security doctrine consisting of two major elements. The first was a broad definition of security, which included not only the defense against external aggression, but also the internal defense against insurgencies and communism. The second component of the national security doctrine was economic development. The importance of economic development and industrialization as the key aspects to sovereignty and independence were strongly advocated by the strategists. Their intent was to promote the integration and the protection of national territory.⁴⁸ Developing the country's vast uninhabited Amazon region with people and markets was of vital importance as well.

Geopolitical concerns led to the formulation of a national security strategy. Brazilian geopolitical thinking dictated that the country was threatened to be isolated by its Spanish-American neighbors. Military leaders emphasized the importance of Latin America in the World and touted Brazil as being the most important country in the region. According to military thinking, the geopolitical importance of Brazil should give Brazil greater bargaining power with world powers, especially the United States.

46 Kelly 1984, 440.

47 Skidmore 1988, 193-97.

48 Ibid., 23.

Moreover, the maintenance of Brazilian maritime capabilities and communications with other continents were vital for survival.⁴⁹

The generals of that time described the current international world order as a situation of “permanent war”. As a result, the distinction between where peace ends and war begins was not very clear. In this setting, enemies of Brazil would rely upon “internal subversion”, which military theoreticians defined as a conflict inspired, stimulated, and aided externally. One of their conclusions from the assessments of the international and domestic conditions of Brazil, as a developing country, was Brazil’s need to achieve internal security as the main part of its national security strategy.⁵⁰

D. FOREIGN POLICY AND USE OF DIPLOMACY

When the military took over the government, they did not change the overarching foreign relations of Brazil. They followed foreign policies in accordance with the permanent national goals of Brazil, such as becoming a respected member of the international system. Moreover, the military governments extended the peaceful tradition of international affairs within Brazil and focused on the social and economic development of the country. In the past, Brazil had sought opportunities to be involved in world politics in WWI and WWII aligning itself with the Allies and continued not to be an isolationist nation during the military regime.⁵¹

The major policy instrument used in foreign relations was political diplomacy. This was done to prevent potential crises from escalating to war. Brazil used diplomacy extensively throughout the 1970s to keep favorable political relations with neighboring countries and to prevent the formation of an anti-Brazilian alliance. The isolating intentions of her Spanish-speaking neighbors and the image of Brazil as being a surrogate of the United States, motivated Brazil to depend on diplomatic bargaining and negotiations.

Brazil’s rapid economic growth during the late 1960s and early 1970s gave the military regime considerable domestic and international legitimacy. In the early and mid-

49 Kelly 1984, 440.

50 Skidmore 1988, 33.

51 Joseph S. Tulchin, *Latin America in the new international system* (Boulder, N.Y., 2001), 156.

1970s, Brazil turned its attention away from hemispheric affairs toward a global view of its economic interests. Brazil shifted its foreign policy to meet its economic needs and started to follow a philosophy of “responsible pragmatism” especially after 1970. “Responsible pragmatism” replaced strict alignment with the United States and an ideological and bloc based worldview. An automatic alignment with U.S. was no longer the trend in Brazilian foreign policy calculations. With more flexibility, pragmatism, and independence in foreign policies, Brazil increased relations with Africa and oil producing countries in the Middle East. In 1977, South Africa became the major export country for Brazil, and later relations with Angola and Mozambique emphasized the importance of South Atlantic relations. Moreover, being heavily dependent on imported oil aligned Brazil with Iraq and Arab countries in the Middle East.⁵²

1. U.S. Relations

The military regime was overtly supported by the United States, which was very concerned about communist subversion. As the military regime adopted policies that the United States favored, Washington showed its appreciation. Between 1964 and 1968, Brazil received more than \$1.5 billion in military and economic aid from U.S.⁵³ By the end of the 1960s, domestic opinion in Brazil and world rejection of the US role in Vietnam helped weaken Brazilian-U.S. relations. At this point, Brazil began to pursue its own interests. During the Geisel administration (1974-79), Brazil shifted from a pro-Israeli stance to a closer relationship with oil-rich Saudi Arabia and Iraq. This was done because Brazil imported 80 percent of its oil. This relationship also allowed Brazil to build stronger ties with Spanish America, Europe, and Japan. Abraham Lowenthal cites the Brazilian challenges to US such as ignoring the US-inspired grain embargo imposed on the Soviet Union in 1980, contradicting US approach in UN by condemning Zionism and accepting Palestine Liberation Organization as a legitimate representative in UN, being the first non-communist nation to recognize Angola in 1974, and having conflicting economic concerns.⁵⁴

52 Hurrell 1983, 179-193.

53 Smith 2000, 158.

54 Abraham F. Lowenthal “Brazil and the United States,” *Foreign Policy Association Headline Series*, No. 279 (1986), 48.

Brazil's 1975 agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) to build nuclear reactors led to confrontation with the Carter administration in U.S. The United States was also scolding the Geisel administration in Brazil for the human rights abuses, as the international and domestic alertness about the issue had increased. Because of mutual distancing policies, Brazil renounced its Military Assistance Agreement with the United States in 1977.⁵⁵ During the Malvinas Crisis (1982), Brazil immediately recognized Argentine sovereignty over the archipelago with a South American regionalist commitment. This assertiveness against the U.S. gave the perception to neighboring countries in the region that Brazil was not as strong a U.S. ally as they had thought.⁵⁶ However, Brazil still felt the need to keep the bilateral relationships with the United States, and continued to consider U.S. perspectives when formulating its foreign policies.⁵⁷

2. Inter-American Relations

In a general perspective, Brazil and the rest of the continent seemed to share socio-economic and cultural similarities, which helped to support close and cooperative relationships within the region. However, historically, despite its geographical location, Brazil's self-identification as a Latin American nation has not developed like the outsiders' perception of Latin America as a whole. The Portuguese heritage and culture, the immensity of the country, and being away from Spanish American population centers impeded Brazilian integration with her Spanish-speaking neighbors.⁵⁸

Brazil's relations with Latin America during the 1970s were strained by ideological differences. The nuclear rivalry with Argentina, Brazil's rapid economic growth and the concerns of its neighbors that Brazil was a U.S. proxy or an expansionist power hindered close relations in the region. Moreover, increased relations with Western Europe, Japan, Africa, and the Middle East aftermath of the economic boom in 1970s undermined the practical role of Inter-American relations in Brazil's foreign policies. The military government believed that the regional multilateral obligations would hinder

55 Selcher 1986, 67.

56 Ibid., 68.

57 Kelly and Child 1988, 98.

58 Selcher 1986, 67.

Brazilian national freedom of action, especially during an era of expanding its influence.⁵⁹

However, when the economic progress ended in the late 1970s, Brazil followed closer relations in the region. The consensus grew in Brazil that its national development could not be planned or achieved separate from Latin American context. The major change in Brazilian Interamerican policies began during the presidency of Joao Figueiredo (1979-1985) who emphasized the need to avoid anti-Brazilian alliances among Latin American countries. In turn, Brazil, without political inhibitions and with the encouragement of its partners, started to expand and enforce its presence in the Southern Cone.⁶⁰ On the other hand, the instability of Central America lessened the attractiveness of this region for Brazil.⁶¹

Brazil sought increased relations in the region, and the nuclear competition with Argentina in late 1970s was the major problem for Brazil. Brazil's tensions with Argentina began to subside towards the end of the 1970s. The evolution of Brazilian-Argentine relations from rivalry to cooperation in nuclear disarmament had been the milestone of Brazil's relations with Latin America. In 1979, the Itapúa-Corpus friction with Argentina was negotiated with mutual satisfaction. Five years before the first democratic regime in Brazil, cooperative attitudes between Brazil and Argentina and other regional partners deepened in 1980.⁶² President Figueiredo was the first Brazilian President ever to visit Bogotá, Lima, and Caracas, and the first to visit Buenos Aires in 45 years.⁶³ Additionally, Brazil and Argentina signed the Foz de Iguazú Declaration, which restricts both nations to the development of nuclear power for non-military purposes, two months before Brazil's transition to democracy in January 1985.

E. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The implications of the peaceful international environment on the domestic realm have been argued in terms of war and state relations, civil-military relations, political

59 Kelly and Child 1988, 97.

60 Ibid., 97.

61 Selcher 1986, 77.

62 Ibid., 68.

63 Ibid., 69.

economy, and bureaucratic politics. The level of analysis will not exceed the domestic level to the individual level in this case, although the prolonged peace has obvious impacts over the individual leaders and the society as the constituents.

1. Assessment of the Political Civil-Military Dimension

In a democratic regime, the political-military dimension of civil-military relations is examined through the separation of power within the state among executive, legislative, and judiciary branches. It is hard to evaluate the state of civil-military relations in a non-democratic or authoritarian regime, where the military controls the power sources of the state, and does not allow civilian political opposition. However, we can still make arguments to analyze the deterioration of relations between civilians and military officials.

The reason for the military to intervene into politics was due to the internal insecurity of the country rather than an emergency in terms of external aggression. Arguably, the lack of tangible external threats allowed the military to focus on domestic considerations. After gaining the authority to rule the country, the military regime utilized repressive measures to counter domestic insecurity and prioritized the economic growth, in a sense to legitimize the military rule. Insurgencies from 1967 through 1973 were successfully defeated and the scope of the state in the economy grew considerably with the deepening of Brazil's industrial base. Growth rates exceeded 11 percent a year between 1968 and 1973 helping to legitimize military rule.⁶⁴

Although the military officials continued to emphasize the external threats, especially from Argentina and the Communist Bloc, the real threat environment was not very tangible. Therefore, the real threat environment rather than the perceptual views of the generals allowed the authoritarian regime to deal with economic development beside internal security problems.

2. Economic Boom and Decline of the Military Regime

In the early years of the military regime, the military governments curbed civil liberties and suppressed the opposition from its opponents. The military government implemented the “Institutional Act” which empowered the military regime against all

64 Skidmore 1988, 138.

political and public oppositions. The military government achieved an economic boom in the early 1970s after fighting with inflation through harsh wage controls and improved tax-collecting measures. The economic developments of authoritarian Brazil were even admired by other Latin American Militaries.

The military's temporary success can be attributed mainly to gathering idle sources together more efficiently. Success began to fade away as further expertise and dedication were needed in the second phase economic reforms in late 1970s and early 1980s. Brazil has failed to supply a consistent social and economic wealth for its people where inequalities prevailed among people and among the regions of the country. The interior territories and the Amazon region have been underdeveloped which increased their vulnerabilities to isolation and unrest.⁶⁵ The violations of human rights and liberties were severely criticized among the Western World. Not only were the business elite and foreign investors unsatisfied in the later periods of the military regime, but also the military itself began to question their roles and missions.

3. Transition to Democracy

The Brazilian transition to democracy from the authoritarian military regime began with the presidency of General Ernesto Geisel in 1974. Geisel and his closest political adviser, General Golbrey do Couto e Silva initiated a controlled liberalization (*abertura*) society. However, the process of democratic transition prolonged until the 1989 presidential elections, despite the governmental elections in 1982 and the first civilian president in 1985. According to Linz and Stepan, the reason for the sixteen-year democratic transition in Brazil was due to the “political economy of legitimacy,” citizen’s perception of the socioeconomic efficacy of a regime, and the poor political party structure at that time.⁶⁶

After going through a series of negotiations with the civilians, the military secured its autonomy and constitutional guarantees to some extent. The economic fragility of the nation and the dependency of the first civilian administration under

65 Kelly 1984, 440.

66 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 167.

President Sarney to the military for political legitimacy favored the military dominance in politics until the early 1990s.

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III. DEMOCRATIZATION AND CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS (1985-2005)

A. INTRODUCTION

The civilian governments after the end of military rule in 1985 will be examined in this chapter. In the same methodology with the previous chapter, the civilian rule in Brazil will be analyzed in four parts in international and domestic levels of analysis. In the first part, the Post Cold War security environment in Latin America, particularly around Brazil in the Southern Cone, will be examined at the international level. In this part, arguments of “stable peace” and democratization, economic integration and Brazil’s national security are the main themes of the period between 1985 and 2005. In the second part, civilian threat perception and national security strategy will be determined in respect to the real threat environment. The major civilian perspective, in contrast to the military, prioritizes the economic threats instead of military defense issues. The third part examines the use of diplomacy in foreign relations of Brazil, where economic integration and national development have become the main policy objectives for the civilian governments. Finally, in the fourth part, the domestic implications of “prolonged peace” in Brazil will be extracted. The evolution of the civil-military relations in the domestic realm affirms the civilian dominance over military views under the absence of serious external threats.

B. LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND BRAZIL

1. Post Cold War Environment

Authors like M. Arie Kacowicz, K. Holsti, and Andrew Hurrell find South America in the last decades as a “zone of peace”, at least a negative peace, instead of a zone of “violent peace” as David Mares articulates. South America is becoming more stable in terms of interstate conflicts, where the attempts for disarmament, organizations for regional stability and peace and transition to democracy are the indicators of stable peace in the region. Interamerican relations in the last two decades have displayed a clear decline in the expectations of hostile border crossings even among those chronic rivals of

the past. Today, virtually all Latin American governments are democratic and are willing to generate better conditions for cooperation in the region.⁶⁷

In respect to the imminent impacts of the end of the Cold War, Augusto Vargas argues that Latin America had not been decisively involved in Cold War except from 1952 to 1960. Therefore, the end of Cold War did not fundamentally affect the defense policies and interests of countries in the region.⁶⁸ Moreover, with the spread of democracy in the 1980s, the end of the Cold War, and, consequently, the relaxation of US security fears about this region, South America has received even lesser attention from the world due to not posing any threat.⁶⁹

On the other hand, the “ideological détente” after Cold War allowed Latin America not to be in a position to take sides in the East-West conflicts regardless of their own national interests. The inward-looking domestic development model within the bipolar international setting has been replaced with a more extroverted course.⁷⁰ The acceleration of international, economic and political interactions, or simply the globalization in the world, has affected all levels of politics and societies in the region. Democratization and political freedom, international markets, communication, and social-economic development have become the issues of political affairs.⁷¹

South America has become an area free from nuclear weapons with low indexes of military expenditures. However, Latin America is not completely free from threats and apparently, it is not yet a full zone of peace. The unilateral US involvement in the region, in terms of military power, is still a big security concern in the region. Moreover, domestic difficulties of overcoming economic inefficiency and spreading democratic consolidation are the current challenges for the legitimacy of the civilian governments.

⁶⁷ Augusto Vargas, “Cooperative Hemispheric Security After the Cold War” in *Regional Mechanisms and International Security in Latin America*, Olga Pellicer (United Nations University Press, 1998), 17.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 16.

⁶⁹ Tulchin 2001, 2.

⁷⁰ Vargas 1998, 10.

⁷¹ Tulchin 2001, 1.

2. Explanations for Peace in Latin America

During the last fifty years, every country in South America has at least one significant period of military rule.⁷² As recently as 1978, more than half of the region lived under military rule. Since then, beginning with Ecuador and Peru, civilian governments replaced military regimes in country after country. Today no military governments remain.⁷³ South American borrowed the “Zone of Peace” concept from Australia and New Zealand in an effort to keep the Cold War from undermining regional security in the 1980s.⁷⁴ Political power of the armed forces has been significantly reduced and arms-control has been popular in the region since the 1990s.

Some theories of peace find the war-peace pattern of this region related to a weak state phenomenon.⁷⁵ However, this approach does not entirely cover the real nature of interstate relations among South American states. For the realist literature, a zone of peace is more likely to be maintained with the existence of a regional hegemon, a regional balance of power, a common third party threat, and/or an isolation of countries in the region. However, neither the unequal balance of power nor the regional hegemonic attitudes shaped the recent decades of South America. There was a potential hegemon in the region of Brazil, similar to the other parts of the world. It has the largest territory, the greatest population, and economic strength among all the states in the region. However, during the twentieth century Brazil has never behaved like a hegemon in the continent and been a threat for its neighbors.⁷⁶ Also, the arguments of common third party threats and the geographic isolation of the countries in the region are not sufficient when we consider the relaxation of international relations in Post Cold War era and the rapid globalization via technologic developments, especially in the area of communication.

From the liberal point of view, regional peace has the prerequisites of regional democracy, economic development, economic interdependence, transnational links and a

⁷² J. Samuel Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America* (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1998), 1.

⁷³ Ibid., xv.

⁷⁴ Mares 2001, 49.

⁷⁵ Holsti 1996, 150.

⁷⁶ Kacowicz 1998, 68.

normative consensus regarding the rules of international law for regional conflicts. Liberal approaches claim that existences of these qualifications contribute to a sustained regional peace.⁷⁷ However, the historical pattern of prolonged peace goes beyond the democratic governments. Even the authoritarian regimes contributed to the peaceful trend of South America in the twentieth century.

3. Transition to Democracy in Brazil

During the final years of the military regime (1979-85), due to the global and domestic trends at that time, the democratic transition became almost inevitable. The military knew its legitimacy nationally and internationally depended entirely on the continuation of economic growth. However, the economic miracle of the 1960s and 1970s disappeared in the early 1980s, and the opposition began to face the dictatorship.⁷⁸ The civilian groups and elites with the support of moderate fraction within the military began to negotiate to end the authoritarian regime in Brazil at the turn of 1980s. The redemocratization process began during the years of President Geisel (1974-79). After several false starts, President Joao Figueiredo (1979-85) managed to deliver the promise of direct elections in 1982. For the first time since 1965, Brazil directly elected all its state governors in November 1982. However, the transition, started in 1974, took almost 16 years until the first direct presidential election since 1960 was held on 15 November 1989.⁷⁹

4. Brazil's Security in the Post-Cold War Era

The new Constitution of 1988 has coincided with the ending process of Cold War in Brazil under the first civilian president Jose Sarney (1985-1990). One of the major aims of the new constitution was to eliminate and redefine the issues related to the previous military governments. The laws and strategies, which were intended to structure Brazilian national security, were re-examined.⁸⁰ The main external threats of the previous era, the communist ideology and the regional rivalry with Argentina, were replaced with

77 Kacowicz 1998, 86.

78 Tracy Ann Breneman, *Brazil's Authoritarian Experience: 1964-1985; A Study of a Conflict* (Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, September, 1995), 95.

79 Skidmore and Smith 2001, 173.

80 Ronaldo Lundgren, "A Brazilian Security Strategy" *Strategy Research Project* (USAWC, Pa, 2002), 9.

the problems of economic development to heal the inflation, foreign depth, unemployment, social well-being through education, health care, internal security, and limited external threats, e.g. drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, and border security, in the Amazon region.

Brazil has developed steadily into a stable and relatively prosperous country since the end of military rule in 1985. As the largest country in South America, it possesses much greater military resources than its neighbors do. Its borders to the north and west are very remote from the nation's population centers. The relations among the nations of the Platine Basin to the south are better than at any time in history. However, although facing very limited external threats, it remains vulnerable to periodic economic shocks, plus region-wide problems of institutionalized corruption, drug trafficking and violent crime.

5. The Amazon and the Tri-Border Area

Maintaining control over the vast Amazon region has become the most pressing issue of territorial defense for Brazilian military.⁸¹ Remote and sparsely populated northern and eastern frontiers allow for the more or less unhindered operation of transnational illegal operations. On the border with Colombia, the problem is real and the threat is immediate for Brazilians. The FARC (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces) guerrillas finance the war they are waging against the Colombian government by lending support to cocaine producers and traffickers. In 1985, the army announced the Northern Corridor (Calha Norte) project in an attempt to establish better control of Brazil's interests in the Amazon. The project has consisted of building a series of outposts along the Brazilian border with Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana.⁸²

Another security issue for Brazil's new millennium context has been the tri-border area between Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina. It has attracted increasing attention

⁸¹ Jane's Information group, "South America, Brazil, External Affairs," *Sentinel Security Assessment* (05-Sep-2005)

http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/samsu/brazs080.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=South%20America%2C%20Brazil%2C%20External%20Affairs&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=SAMS& (accessed 10/15/2005).

⁸² *Threats on the Border* (WWNC Editorial, December 16, 2002)

<http://www.floridabrasil.com/brazil/about-Brazil-National-Security-Military-Amazon.htm> (accessed 9/20/2005).

since the “war on terrorism” which has dominated the global agenda. Although Brazil does not fully share the concerns of U.S. about the tri-border area, Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) has paid attention to the area, where U.S. and Argentine intelligence services determined potential security vulnerabilities. In January 2003, General James Hill, head of US Southern Command, stated that Islamic terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Palestinian Hamas and the Egyptian Al-Gama'a al-Islamiya (Islamic Group) were operating in the area, although he provided no hard evidence of this.⁸³ These people regularly remit money to relatives in Palestine, Syria, and other countries in the Middle East. Additionally, due to lassitude of Paraguayan laws and the ease of movement from one country to another, the region has become a sort of no-man's land in which contraband of every sort of merchandise, including drugs and arms, flow freely and large sums of money are laundered with relative ease.

C. THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

1. National Interests and Threats

When examining the current threat perceptions by the government and the military, national interests are the core elements that illuminate the national security strategies. In Brazil, the national interests can be dealt within three titles: vital, important, and peripheral interests. The vital interests are sovereignty, protection of citizenry and national integrity, and development with social peace. Some more important interests are improving the democratic institutions, strengthening the free trade, contributing regional and international peace. Finally, the peripheral interests are increasing Brazil's participation in the international decision-making process and greatness in the international order.⁸⁴

The 1988 Constitution clearly prohibits carrying out wars of conquest, and under the current policy guidance of national security, Brazil does not expect an interstate war with her neighboring countries. President Cardoso, in 1996, announced that Brazil enjoys a strategic “peace ring” because of Mercosur and the Amazonic Treaty of Cooperation. The peace, as a result, is due to many factors such as the peaceful historical tradition and

83 Jane's Information group Brazil: External Affairs 2005.

84 Lundgren 2002, 3-4.

the current satisfaction with its borders, the power of the armed forces in the region to dissuade such conflicts, being ruled by a democratic regime and the interdependence brought with the adoption of a market economy.⁸⁵

On the other hand, despite the common sense about prolonged peace in the region, Brazil's strategists also foresee some potential transnational threats for the country as well. Although there is no clear definition of a state actor to pose a threat to Brazil, there are some non-state actors that threaten the collective security in the region and inside Brazil, such as terrorism and organized crime embedded in drug trafficking, arm smuggling and money laundering. In the regional framework, Brazil evaluates the instability in the neighboring countries that can threaten Brazilian interests on the edge of the Brazilian Amazon.⁸⁶ Brazil may be forced to become involved in conflicts originating elsewhere, due to threats to Brazil's national heritage or vital interests.

2. Post Cold War Environment and National Defense Strategy

For Brazilians, South America is considered the most demilitarized region in the world, which is far away from the international rivalry and tensions. One of the major sources of their assessment is based on the re-democratizations that have taken place in the continent reducing the likelihood of conflicts. During the last decades, most regional disputes have been managed through peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms.

The first National Defense Policy (NDP) document of the country was produced in November 1996, under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, and the most recent document was produced in 1998.⁸⁷ By definition, defense white papers are not only the primary source for the current administration, but also represent the historical legacy of unchanging national goals. Not all national aspirations and goals are explicitly expressed in these public sources; however, they are the aggregation of political, military, and social thoughts of decision makers in a given country.

The document explicitly declares that Brazil has no territorial ambitions, rejects wars of conquest, gives priority to the peaceful solution of controversies, will use force

85 Lundgren 2002, 9.

86 Presidencia da Republica, "Brazilian National Defense Policy: the International Situation" (Brasilia, 1998). https://www.planalto.gov.br/publi_04/colecao/Poli.htm (accessed 10/11/2005).

87 Fujita 1998, 578.

only as a source of self-defense and seeks close relations with its neighbors and the international community based on mutual confidence and respect.⁸⁸ Brazil's defense white book asserts, "Brazil has not been involved in a conflict with any of its neighbors for over a century, and it has worked to promote greater integration and closer relations among the nations in the Americas and, consequently, has gained international credibility."⁸⁹

Brazilian authorities describe the uncertainties that characterize the Post Cold War international context and emphasize the importance of a national defense, which "continues to require diligence by national governments."⁹⁰ With respect to the permanent national goals of Brazil, which seeks greatness in the international realm, the military authorities and civilian counterparts assess that "it is not realistic to imagine a nation-state of reasonable size and international influence that could forgo having a dependable defense force."⁹¹

Brazilian defense strategy aims to guarantee its sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interests, democratic institutions and the rule of law to protect Brazilian citizens, goods and resources, to promote Brazilian interests abroad, to project Brazil's participation in international decision-making mechanisms and finally to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.⁹² In order to accomplish these objectives, the National Defense Policy outlines the directives for the related actors in the state. The main directive is to increase Brazil's contribution in the international decision-making processes through promoting international rule of law, a position in favor of global disarmament, participating in peacekeeping operations and expanding the regional integration. One relevant aspect of these directives is the participation of the Armed Forces in supportive activities in Brazil. These activities include civil defense, social and economic development and the protection of Brazilian Amazon with military presence.⁹³

88 Fujita 1998, 581.

89 Brazilian National Defense Policy: *the International Situation* 1998.

90 Ibid.

91 Lundgren 2002, 5.

92 Fujita 1998, 581.

93 Brazilian National Defense Policy: *Directives*, 1998.

3. Economic Threats and the Amazon Region

In regards to the changing international order in the post Cold War environment, the major priority of national security in Brazil was given to the economic and social development of the country. The economic liberalization adopted by Latin American countries in 1990s led to growing levels of economic, societal and political interdependence. This changed the countries' mutual threat perceptions and created incentives for largely bilateral conflict prevention regimes. Today the main international policy issues of Brazil are listed as science and technology, disarmament, development, cultural diplomacy, human rights and social issues, environment, and drug-trafficking in which we can clearly see there is no concern about an external aggression.⁹⁴

Economic crises are considered the major contributor to the insecurity of Brazilian people. Risk of unemployment, possible return of inflation, a slow justice decision-making process, low quality level of education, strikes in essential public services and struggles to preserve consumer rights are the concerns of collective perception of insecurity.⁹⁵ Considering that all political activity is ultimately accountable to the constituents in democratic regimes, in times of crisis, the population can apply severe pressure on political decisions by indirectly influencing the politicians.

The protection and development of the Amazon region, which occupies more than half of Brazil's territory, has become another major national priority in Brazil. The military preserved its autonomy to protect and operate in the Amazon region during the transition to democracy and continue to be assertive in the region with projects such as development of the Amazon surveillance System (SIVAM) and "Calha Norte" Project (North Path Project).⁹⁶ The military threat perception related to the Amazon region, such as illegal activities, underdevelopment, strikes and exploitation of the sources by external powers like US, is still an issue for national security strategy. Military strategists like General Alberto Cardoso, Chief of the Institutional Defense Cabinet and one of the

⁹⁴ Brazil, Ministry of External Relations, Foreign Policy: *International Agenda issues* http://www.mre.gov.br/ingles/politica_externa/relacoes/america_sul/index.asp (accessed 10/12/2005).

⁹⁵ Lula da Silva, Inaugural Speech, *Embassy of Brazil in London* (01/01/2003) <http://www.brazil.org.uk/page.php?n=268> (accessed 10/15/2005).

⁹⁶ Jane's Information Group, "Brazilian Forces Strength Amazon Borders" *Jane's International Defense Review*, No. 27, (Jan. 1994), 9.

architects of the new national defense policy adopted by Fernando Henrique Cardoso's administration, explain the concerns of depopulation in the Amazon region and calls for combined efforts from all sectors of the country including the military and civil-society.⁹⁷ However, in contrast to the military perspectives, the civilians assess the international concerns for the tropical forests and follow policies more responsive to international concerns.⁹⁸

D. FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Brazilian strategic orientation is twofold, an “active diplomacy” pursuing peace and greatness in the world and “a deterrent posture of defensive character” to assure its sovereignty.⁹⁹ Brazil strongly holds on to the principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention in the Western Hemisphere, particularly from the United States. A second characteristic of Brazilian foreign policy is that Brazil aspires to be a world leader politically and economically.¹⁰⁰

There are some overlapping definitions for the foreign policy strategies pursued by Brazilian governments in the last decade: “Pax Americana” (South American Peace), “pacing and hedging”, and the “strategy of insertion” are among the major terms of the foreign affairs in Brazil. Tulchin defines Brazil’s foreign policy since the 1990s to be characterized by the acceptance of the core values and norms of the “Pax Americana” and by a drive towards a greater participation and acceptance of international institutions on the global, regional, sub regional and bilateral levels.¹⁰¹ He also argues that Brazil, facing the uncertainty of globalization, has adopted a strategy of “pacing and hedging”. In this perspective, Brazil prefers to move gradually and with caution in expanding regional cooperation in order to gain time to establish a general sense of unity and direction for the country and its neighbors in the international arena.¹⁰² By the term “strategy of insertion”,

97 BBC Monitoring, “Article previews new national defense policy,” Summary of World Broadcasts Section; Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Original Source: O Globo, Rio de Janeiro (October 27, 1996) <http://infoweb.newsbank.com> (accessed 10/12/2005)

98 Hunter 1996, 126.

99 Presidencia da Republica, Brazilian National Defense Policy 1996

100 Hunter 1996, 128.

101 Tulchin 2001, 157.

102 Ibid., 93.

which covers the acceptance of international regimes and norms, Tulchin stresses the preference of growing participation in UN operations, a wider participation in commercial multilateral negotiations and an emphasis on regional stability rather than sub regional competition.

1. Diplomacy as the Major Policy Tool for Brazil

After the 1980s, Brazil changed the foreign policy objectives connected with “high policy” concerning national security and military power than with objectives of “low policy”, regional commercial integration, or multilateral agreements. Brazilian National Defense Policy (1998), in accordance to its peaceful legacy, was built around an “active diplomacy devoted to peace, as well as a deterrent strategic posture.”¹⁰³ Today, Brazilian diplomacy is much more focused on international agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, rather than military issues, such as the 1952 military agreement with the US.¹⁰⁴

With the declining priority of the military defense strategies after the 1990s, Brazil found the opportunities to concentrate efforts in foreign policy to achieve national development and to overcome social inequalities. The major issues in the contemporary foreign affairs of Brazil have been globalization, Interamerican relations, bilateral relations with U.S. and contacts with overseas countries such as EU, China, Japan, India, and South Africa.

2. Regional Relations

In the Post Cold War era, Latin America shifted from an inward looking international model to more outward policies.¹⁰⁵ Relations in the region have prospered with the regional institutions such as OAS, Mercosur, Rio Treaty and the non-proliferation agreements. In the last decades after the end of military rule, Brazil has increased bonds with its neighbors in the Southern Cone and the Amazon Region. Mercosur in the south and the Amazon Cooperation Treaty with the neighbors in the Amazon region have strengthened the integration process and close relations.

103 Brazilian National Defense Policy: Strategic Guidance 1998.

104 Jane's Information group Brazil: External Affairs 2005.

105 Olga Pellicer, *Regional Mechanisms and International Security in Latin America* (United Nations University Press, 1998),13.

Among Latin American nations, Brazil sees itself as the natural leader in the region. This can also be revealed through the figures of economic integration, especially in the Southern Cone, pointing Brazil as the major trader in the region. However, despite the mediating and leading role in the interstate and intrastate conflicts in the region, as well as economic integration, Brazil still seems reluctant to undertake the full-fledged leadership in Latin America.

3. Relations with the United States

The United States has a special position in the politics of all Latin American states. The special alliance between U.S. and Brazil endured only until the early 1960s. After this period, the United States was no longer the focal point for Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil generally opposed the interventionist policies of the U.S., but did not move further than mild objections, because of the fact that Brazil cannot bear the burdens of being the target of U.S assertiveness. Starting from the military years, the civilian administrations, with variations of intensity, clashed over a large number of issues including the management of the debt crisis, trade and investment issues (especially informatics and intellectual property rights), trade questions in the GATT, and environmental and Amazonian policies with The United States.¹⁰⁶

The current issue of Brazil's foreign relations with the United States is about the negotiations of FTAA. Brazil prefers to develop a negotiation strategy that will result in postponing decisions on international or regional integration in order to provide more time for their economies to increase in competitiveness and adjust to the levels of their key partners. In response to the hesitancy of Brazil, U.S. wants to increase its bilateral trade surplus and political consequences of the integration.¹⁰⁷ Another example of Brazil's diplomatic challenge to the U.S. was after the "global war on terror" when U.S. launched strict measures for foreigners coming to the U.S. Brazil responded with the fingerprinting and photographing of US citizens visiting Brazil since 1 January 2004 as a retaliatory measure for the implementation of the US-VISIT programme.¹⁰⁸

106 Lowenthal 1986, 48.

107 Tulchin 2001, 107.

108 Jane's Information group Brazil: External Affairs 2005.

4. Relations Outside the Region

The civilian governments, particularly the last two administrations under Cardoso and Lula, have been seeking opportunities to increase the economic relations with alternative countries instead of relying solely on developed economies such as US and EU. South Africa, Japan, India, and the EU are the focus areas of bilateral contacts of Brazilian foreign policy outside the region. Foreign policy under President Lula has shown a more independent and self-confident Brazil, more critical of the US, and pursuing a more aggressive trade policy to defend national and regional interests. This has included the forming of new alliances with other neutral emerging powers such as China, India and South Africa as well as deepening those with states such as Russia and the Ukraine, and seeking new trade links with the Middle Eastern states.¹⁰⁹

According to 2002 record, after U.S. and Argentina, Netherlands, China, Germany, and Japan are the principal trading partners for Brazil.¹¹⁰ Brazil became a key member of a new axis of powerful developing nations known as BRICS, formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. These countries have a combined population of nearly three billion people, about half the world's total, and the continuing economic growth, particularly in China and India, has made these economies very large in terms of absolute size.¹¹¹

The relations with the Portuguese speaking African countries developed with the consolidation of the South Atlantic Zone of Peace and Cooperation have also contributed to the “ring of peace” around Brazil in terms of external affairs. Currently, Brazil is also involved in technical-military co-operation with the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP): Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe, and East Timor.¹¹² Moreover, by joining the UN peacekeeping operations in Angola, Mozambique, and most recently East Timor, who share some

109 Jane's Information group Brazil: External Affairs 2005.

110 Jacqueline West, *South America, Central America, and the Caribbean 2004* (Europa Publications, 2003).203.

111 Jane's Information group Brazil: External Affairs 2005.

112 Comunidade dos Paises de Lingua Portuguesa, List of the Members

<http://www.cplp.org/linksuteis.asp> (accessed 11/28/2005)

similar cultural and linguistic heritage with Brazil, Brazil sees the opportunity to fill a leadership void in the Portuguese-speaking world.

E. DOMESTIC REALM AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN BRAZIL

Frederick Nunn claims that the state-military relations and the rules are not the same after the contemporary global environment; therefore, they have to be redefined accordingly.¹¹³ How has the change in the international environment affected Brazilian civil-military relations between 1985 and 2005? In order to answer this question, the state of CMR in Brazil and the impacts of the threat environment are analyzed.

In the new era of civilian politics in Brazil, the lack of external threat has been more obvious unlike during the military rule before 1985. After reining the power, the civilian authority prioritized the economic, industrial and social developments rather than defense and national security concerns.

1. Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Brazil Since 1985

The military formally left power in 1985, but Brazil's transition had begun a decade earlier, during the presidency of General Ernesto Geisel (1974-79). Despite its growing loss of support among the business sector, the regime did not face broad, united opposition to its rule until the economic situation deteriorated in early 1980s.¹¹⁴ The cooperative politics with neighboring countries, especially with Argentina during late 1970s and early 1980s, the diminishing threat of communism and changing preferences of elites in Brazil altered the threat perceptions of the key actors in the politics of Brazil.

The first civilian, President Jose Sarney (1985-1990), in the crisis environment, heavily relied on the military for political support. Therefore, the combination of extensive military autonomy and the weakness of civilian institutions, right after the transition to democracy, contributed to the continuation of the military influence. The military preserved its constitutional mission as the guarantor of law and order. The civilian authority could not manage to restrict the military tasks to external defense and failed to find a civilian defense ministry. One of the major debates under the first civilian administration was about the elimination of the National Security Council. President

¹¹³ Frederick M. Nunn, "Peace and War in Latin America: Changing Perspectives on Military-Civilian Relations," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (June 2004), 292.

¹¹⁴ Breneman 1995.

Sarney decreed the creation of a Secretariat of National Defense, which would exercise the same powers as a Security Council. Moreover, the technological and industrial interests of the military were successfully preserved in the Constitution.¹¹⁵ Enduring control of the defense sector has provided the military enhanced political influence on a broad range of issues.¹¹⁶ According to Hunter, “the absence of an electoral mandate weakened Sarney’s capacity to challenge such a historically powerful institution.”¹¹⁷

These early patterns seen in the first civilian government have changed with the successive governments. Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992) aggressively attacked military prerogatives including slashing the budget and privatizing major defense industries. He worked for nuclear disarmament of the military due to the intense international pressures.¹¹⁸ However, his impeachment in 1992 slowed the momentum of his military reform policies. His vice president and successor, Itamar Franco (1992-1994), lacked the political influence to carry out Collor’s reforms.

In 1994, Finance Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso, was elected President in Brazil and made economic development the number one priority of his administration. He played a delicate balancing game with the military, attempting to exert civilian control while appeasing the military financially. Although disbanding the National Security Council and National Intelligence Service, and reducing the defense budget cuts of the traditional influence means of military, the military still remained as an important veto power in the government’s major policy shifts.¹¹⁹

The constitutional design of ministerial power favoring military has been changed in 1999 with the foundation of a new Ministry of Defense under a civilian minister. With the approval of the new Ministry by the Brazilian Senate on June 1999, the military ministers became service branch commanders and lost their cabinet-level status.

115 Ken Conca, “Technology, the Military, and Democracy in Brazil,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Spring, 1992), 151.

116 Linz and Stepan 1996, 169.

117 Wendy Hunter, *State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the military’s role in Argentina, Brazil and Chile* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996), 43.

118 Conca 1992,160.

119 Ibid., 161.

Another important issue in civil-military dimension is the role of armed forces in guiding the course of Amazonian development. The “soft” border and lack of state infrastructure have rendered the military an important factor in the region. Growing international concern since the early 1980s for the rain forest and its indigenous populations, and the advent of democracy in 1985, have introduced serious challenges to the military’s ability to continue dominating the formulation of policies affecting Amazonia.¹²⁰

2. The Current State of Civil-Military Relations

The current state of civil-military relations in Brazil is not unambiguously defined by the scholars. Some scholars like Wendy Hunter supports the idea that the military influence is destined to fade in the new environment after 1985. According to Hunter, “democratically elected politicians have successfully contested the military over a broad range of issues and narrowed its sphere of political influence.”¹²¹ Hunter argues that the military prerogatives are less influential and privileged than they were in the initial period of the civilian rule.¹²² Such prerogatives are the positions in National Security Council and National Information Agency, a continuing role in the management of strategic industries such as informatics and telecommunications, a predominant voice involving nuclear issues, a developing occupation of the Amazon, retention of some influence over militarized state police and protection from legislative oversight in areas such as military intelligence.

However, Jorge Zaverucha claims the opposite view, that the military influence in Brazil remained strong in spite of democratic reforms due to the constitutional guarantees about the military roles. Article 142 of the Brazilian constitution defines the military as the “guardian of constitutional powers, of the law, and of public order.”¹²³ Zaverucha presents the continued role of the military in internal affairs, such as domestic

120 Maria Helena de Castro Santos, “Adapting to Democratic Politics: The Military in Post-Transition Brazil, Brasa v Congresso,” *Internacional Recife* (June 18-22, 2000), 14.

121 Wendy Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers* (The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 2.

122 David Pion-Berlin, *Civil-military relations in Latin America : new analytical perspectives* (University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 37.

123 Jorge Zaverucha, “Prerrogativas militares: de Sarney a Cardoso,” *Monitor Publico* 4/12, (January-March 1997), 35-41.

intelligence and police operations, as evidence. Brazilian military has maintained a large number of internal missions, especially the expanding mission in the Amazon region.

The actual state of CMR in Brazil is distinctly between these two extreme ends and it varies according to the area. The military influence continued during the very first years of transition to democracy through the defense industry and security related policies. As the governments have become less depended on military for political support, the civilian assertiveness increased against military prerogatives.

The absence of regional and international threats seems to contribute to Brazil's CMR in some areas such as the foundation of a civilian defense ministry and the elimination of the National Security Agency and National Intelligence Agencies under military dominance. However, in accordance with Desch's argument, the lack of a serious external threat hindered the civilian leaders' expertise in defense and security issues, which are left to military autonomy. The lack of interest in defense and security strategies and industries among the government institutions and the society helped the military to preserve its influence in politics. Militaries, which have exclusive control over state revenues or industries, are more difficult to control than when the armed forces control internal security agencies. With this in mind, it is difficult to prevent military intervention in politics.

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IV. COMPARISON AND THE CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I will try to compare the politics of the military regime from 1964-85 and the civilian regime after 1985, in terms of Brazil's peaceful security environment. In the previous chapters, the authoritarian Brazil and the civilian democracy have been examined within four dimensions: the international environment, threat perception, foreign policy, and domestic policies. The same dimensions will be analyzed to assess the implications of prolonged peace under different threat perceptions. Following the comparison of two periods, in the conclusion, the future role of the Brazilian military, whether focused internally or externally, will be discussed.

Below is table for the variables and major themes of our comparison.

Table 1 Variables of Comparison

Variables	Military Regime (1964-85)	Civilian Regime (1985-2005)
International Security Environment and Type of Peace (International level)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- CW bipolar system in the world- Violent or armed peace in Latin America- No external aggression against Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- PCW multipolarity and U.S. hegemony in the world- Stable Peace in South America- Cooperation and integration for Brazil
Threat Perception and National Security Strategy (Domestic level)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Argentina rivalry and nuclear programs (external threat)- Communist subversion and ideological divisions (internal security)- Socio-economic problems and development- National security state and militarization	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Economic threats and dependency- Non-traditional threats and organized crime- Development and protection of the Amazon Region- National security documents and new priorities
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy (international level)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Military and political diplomacy- Extra-regional relations and U.S.- Interamerican relations, competition, and cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Economic-diplomatic relations- Regional Integration- Alternative trade partners and opposition to U.S.
Domestic Affairs and Civil-Military Relations (Domestic level)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- National Security State and internal missions of the military- Military role driven by threat perception- Transition to democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Dominance of civilian views- Economic-social development- Democratic consolidation and eroding military privileges in policy making process

B. LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND BRAZIL

By any consideration, definition and explanation of conflict and peace, it is a common conclusion that South America has for the most part been a very peaceful nation throughout this century. No other region in the world possessed as many bilateral and multilateral documents, treaties, and charters imposing obligations for peaceful settlements of disputes as South American States did during this time period. Arbitral procedures for resolving conflicts have been used at extraordinarily high rates compared to other regions of the world. A recent study states that there are eight peaceful territorial changes in South America since 1900 and only two territorial conflicts were resolved by war. From the 1820s until 1970, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela used arbitration procedures 151 times.¹²⁴

1. Military Years

The military years witnessed the competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Brazil felt the impacts of the bipolar system in the societal arena through ideological conflicts, but not in its interstate relations. However, except for the peak of nuclear rivalry in the 1960s involving Central America, Latin American states were not on the spot for the most part of the Cold War. The legacy of not having major interstate wars in the region since the turn of twentieth century has prevailed among Latin America during the military years in Brazil. Argentina's nuclear rivalry and the communist subversion in Brazil were the two potential threats for Brazil in this period. Moreover, the economic problems and underdevelopment were also main concerns on the onset of the military rule. The security environment for Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s was not as fragile and suspicious as David Mares articulates for authoritarian Latin America. Therefore, we can evaluate the external security environment for authoritarian Brazil as a continuation of century long peaceful tradition in Brazil's interstate relations, especially in the 1980s when the security dilemma in Argentine relations began to fade away.

124 Tulchin 2001, 156.

2. Civilian Years

After 1985 in Brazil and after the end of the Cold War in Latin America, the interstate relations became more cooperative and peaceful. The Region possessed the qualifications of zones of peace, as Kacowicz examines the Inter-American relations, particularly for the last half of the twentieth century. Latin America's importance, in terms of global competitions of world powers, has been reduced in the Post Cold War system. Countries within the region gained the opportunity to pursue their economic and national interests, instead of taking sides between western and eastern blocs. The third wave of democracy changed the military regimes and their “national security state” ideologies with the primacy of social and economic development.

Brazil joined the global and regional trend of democratization even during the last military government in late 1970s and early 1980s. The external security environment for Brazil under the civilian regimes has been free from tangible threats, in contrast to the previous era of nuclear and ideological competition. The economic threats and social inequality, organized crime, and the development of the Amazon Region became major concerns of national security. The conflictual issues with Argentina, nuclear proliferation and Itaipú conflict, were solved in the late 1980s. After the 1990s, Brazil's economic integration, Mercosur and SAFTA, with South American countries and the alternative relationships with extra regional countries in Africa, Middle East, Asia, and Europe strengthened the “ring of peace” around Brazil under civilian governments.

C. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN THREAT PERCEPTIONS

Defining the national security priorities of Latin American countries shaped by threat perception is an important variable in our analysis. Most of the time, the perceived threats, rather than the real type or levels of the threats, are more influential in policy-making processes.

1. Military Regimes

The military governments in the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America exploited the term “national security” in their countries. The ambiguity in the definition of national security, strategic policies, and threat perceptions allowed the military to play a big role during the military regimes after 1964. The military was keeping the civilians out of

defense policy formulation, and the civilians were not adept at dealing with security issues due to lack of professionalism and interest.

Geography has always been a strong component of Brazil's national security policy, and the same geopolitical thinking influenced the threat perception when the military was in charge in Brazil. The incalculable resources of Brazil, e.g. the fresh water in the Amazon, were in danger of external attacks and exploitation. Moreover, the communist ideology, isolating intentions of her Spanish-speaking neighbors, nuclear aggressions from Argentina, dependency on global economies, and U.S. hegemony in Brazil's sphere of interests were among the security agenda items of the military regimes.

The strategy of the military leaders in response to the perceived threats had four basic elements. These elements are improving national defense capabilities, particularly through weapon modernization and war industry, keeping the status quo with Argentina and improving bilateral economic contacts, giving a special emphasis to the relationship with the United States, and extending the relations and ties with Bolivia and Paraguay in the La Plata basin.¹²⁵ Brazil's strategy required both military and diplomatic relations in its foreign policies. In contrast to the actual state of external threats against Brazil, the military threat perceptions put Brazil in a position to linger between prolonged peace and armed-peace in international relations. The security concerns, however, changed in the later years of the military regimes in accordance with the real threat environment.

2. Civilian Regimes

In Latin America, the traditional national security perceptions changed with the rise of democratization and the economic opening in the 1980s and 1990s. The governments realized the benefits of cooperation rather than military competition with their neighbors. Unlike the clarity of threats within a bipolar system, contemporary international systems brought the ambiguity of a solid external threat. Countries became more preoccupied with the perceived threat to national security presented by growing social inequality, poverty, and ethnic divisions. The new environment brought the need to

¹²⁵ Skidmore and Smith 2001, 152.

balance the security concerns of states with the aspirations of populations towards social well-being.¹²⁶

In Brazil, the civilians officially took over the government in 1985, but practically the civilian elites began to impose their threat perceptions in national security strategies in the second civilian government elected in 1990. After the 1990s, as the threat perception altered with the changes in the international realm, the civilian authority could break the dominance of geopolitical military thinking in security policies.

The new Brazilian Constitution, promulgated in 1988, reflects changed perceptions for the national security policy, and guides the policy-makers. Security has become more complex than merely military provisions in the Post-Cold War era. The civilian governments wisely developed a strategy of sustainable national defense policy based on socio-economic development needs of the country, rather than a one-dimensional perception of the country's prospective military requirements.¹²⁷ The social and economic inequalities, inflation, organized crime, and instability of the neighboring countries continued to concern civilians. When compared, with the military perceptions, I believe, the civilian security agenda seems more harmonious with the real external threats against Brazil.

D. CHANGE IN FOREIGN RELATIONS

The national security prerogatives and changing foreign relations are the main indicators of our comparison for the military and civilian rule in Brazil. Brazil as a nation has always strived to achieve greatness and recognition in world politics, this yearning continues to drive Brazilian foreign policy in the 21st century.¹²⁸ This traditional orientation influenced the national strategies of both military and civilian elites. In many cases, aspects of competitive and non-cooperative nature of Brazilian foreign policy and national security have reflected the aspirations to become a leading country in the world. Brazil's protective attitudes over the Amazon and challenging stance against American hegemony, supporting a larger defense industry, and Brazil's attempts to gain a

126 Fujita 1998, 579.

127 Ibid., 585.

128 Celso Lafer, "Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, present, and future," *Daedalus* (Spring 2000), 207.

permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council are the indicators of this orientation.¹²⁹

Brazil developed a diplomatic culture based on the peaceful resolution of disputes, in favor of mediation and negotiation. Brazil has not taken on a hegemonic responsibility for South American events, nor has it carried out overt interventions or made pronouncements on internal affairs of neighboring states. In its external affairs, Brazil refused to assume roles such as continental hegemony or the Third World leadership against world powers. Concentration on internal political liberalization and economic recovery hindered a larger role for Brazil in the recent past, but, at the same time, further lessened local suspicions about hegemonic pretensions.¹³⁰

1. Military Rule

Brazil perceived a high level of external threat in the 1960s and 1970s, then shifted its policies in accordance with the low level of external threats in the 1980s. Despite the early geopolitical perceptions about the external threats, the national security strategies of the military governments prioritized the economic development and internal security rather than external defense. The military regime kept diplomatic dialogue open and promoted the image of Brazil as a trustworthy partner. Brazil tried to avoid international frictions and stay out of others' conflicts during the military regime, where the international context itself made cooperative relations favorable for Brazil.

2. Civilian Rule

After 1985, Brazil continued to be a moderate status-quo power on political issues and was more focused on economic development. One of the biggest indicators of a major foreign policy change in Brazil was relations with Argentina. The Argentine and Brazilian relationship changed after 1980 from conflict to cooperation. This development represents a change in mindset from the feelings of suspicion and competition that characterized the pre-1980 era, where historically aggressive geopolitical theories dominated the politics. Due to either the end of military rule or the economic necessities of the era, it is clear that the international threat environment played an important

¹²⁹ David Malone, "Haiti and the International Community: A Case Study," *Survival* 39, no. 2 (Summer 1997), 127-29.

¹³⁰ Selcher 1986, 101.

conditional role for cooperative foreign relations, and Brazil will probably continue its integration in the Southern Cone.

E. DEMOCRATIZATION AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The impacts of the external context on domestic and bureaucratic spheres are not easy to extract. However, the overall examination of the internal policy debates in Brazil, focused on economic and social development rather than defense issues, reflects some clues about the implications of a peaceful interstate position. Moreover, the level of civil-military relations in Brazil provides an understanding of who makes the policy decisions and the consequences of these decisions.

1. Authoritarian Brazil

Brazil experienced relatively low levels of external threats in the 1960s and 1970s and arguably in the 1980s, despite perceived threats from Communism and Argentina. Even under the military rule between 1964 and 1985, the armed forces restricted their own budget in favor of an intensive public investment programme for civilian industrialization.¹³¹ The new international order, the economic and social globalization, and the increasing interdependence among the countries in the world affected the Brazilian politics beginning in the 1980s. During the last years of the military rule in Brazil, the trend was towards a democratic government prioritizing the economic and social development of the country instead of focusing on threat possibilities.

The external and internal threats perceived by the military governments were used as reasons to avoid the political opposition from civilians. The political opposition and civil liberties were curbed by the authoritarian rule until the 1980s in Brazil. Moreover, the economic miracle achieved by the military governments in mid the 1970s assured the duration of a military presence in politics, but their inefficiency in further addressing economic needs of the country in late the 1970s and early 1980s shifted political alliances. The civilian elites, the businessmen, and the emerging middle-class began to speak out for a regime change, whereas the military regime itself also initiated some liberalization efforts in public policies in the late 1970s.

131 Fujita 1998, 577.

2. Democratic Brazil

The end of the military rule was not only a result of changing threat environments inside and outside Brazil, but also a causal factor for the establishment of new foreign and domestic policies. The military government gave up the power in 1985; however, the military as an institution preserved a considerable amount of influence after intense negotiations with the first civilian government under President Sarney. In the later presidencies, strengthening the civilian control over military in Brazil can be associated to the changing international environment and threat perceptions. After the 1980s, the civilian governments were able to prioritize social and economic developments rather than obeying the military prerogatives.

Civilian governments ended the armed forces' previous monopoly on decisions affecting national security and defense, through national security institutions, intelligence services, defense industries, and strategic nuclear programs.¹³² President Collor abolished the military-dominated intelligence service and Security Council in 1990. He signed an agreement with Argentina allowing inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency and endorsed measures to curb ecological devastation and protect indigenous populations in the Amazon, opposing the military's strong interest in developing the region. President Cardoso founded the Ministry of Defense in 1999 and disbanded previous ministerial positions of the armed services. I agree with Hunter's main argument that the electoral incentives and the popular support enhanced the civilians' capacity to do so.¹³³

3. Brazil's Military Role in the Future

Since the Second World War, the traditional role of the militaries as an instrument of a state's territorial expansion has changed.¹³⁴ Military leaders, having difficulties to point out tangible external enemies, argue that defense is like insurance until the need arises. However, in a setting where economic resources are tight and scarce, politicians are reluctant to allocate funds for such vague potential contingencies. Electoral incentives

132 Hunter 1996, 69.

133 Ibid., 2.

134 Lundgren 2002, 17.

motivate politicians to search for economic assets to distribute as political pork barrel, where defense expenditures in Brazil yield little electoral capital.

Today in Brazil, one of the major issues in domestic affairs is the role of the armed forces in relation to the actual external threat environment. Will the military in Brazil focus solely on external missions such as preparing for an external war and multinational peacekeeping operations, or will the military be preoccupied with internal security such as anti-drug operations, fighting organized crime, and development of Amazon region? The end of the Cold War, the absence of border conflicts, and the peaceful international context allowed the military to be more involved in internal missions in Brazil. State military police and military fire brigades are still controlled by the army.¹³⁵ However, there is still reluctance within the military and democratization efforts on the civilian side for avoiding the internal focus of the military.

Brazil is a nation that developed the capacity to make nuclear weapons and then appeared to abandon its weapons programme. Brazil's nuclear capabilities are the most advanced in Latin America, having a dependable raw material base for developing nuclear power engineering, highly skilled scientific specialists, technologies for enriching uranium, and several nuclear research centers.¹³⁶

My general assessment is that Brazil will not undermine its military capability while exploiting the peaceful environment in the region. Whatever the international environment is, military capacity will always stay in the core of national strategies of the countries. No economic and social improvement can absolutely guarantee the sustainability of the security environment, unless supported with military power. However, for Brazil, given the state of the Brazilian armed forces, significant hard power is not available at present, and economic power is the primary source of influence in Brazil's foreign affairs.

135 Jorge Zaverucha, "Fragile Democracy and the Militarization of Public Safety in Brazil," *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol.27, No. 3 (May 2000), 10.

136 Jane's Intelligence Digest, "South America: Brazil: External Affairs; Brazil's nuclear ambitions," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment*, (February 2004) http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/mags/jid/history/jid2004/jid00379.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=Brazil's%20nuclear%20ambitions&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JID& (accessed 10/15/2005).

F. CONCLUSION

The reasons to examine the military rule and civilian rule separately were to compare different threat perceptions under mainly similar external threat environments, the lack of interstate wars in our case, and to answer whether the regional peace enhanced or hindered Brazil's national goal of greatness. In Latin America, the institutionalization of the pre-existing peaceful environment in the 1990s, was not only a result of changing threat perceptions under democratic regimes, but also a reason itself to change Brazilian policies towards further economic and security cooperation with its neighbors. I argue that the absence of hostile behaviors in South America increased the benefits of more cooperative foreign policies in Brazil in both security and economic based relations. However, the peaceful international environment hindered long-term state capacity of Brazil who has hegemonic aspirations in the region and the world. The peaceful relations enhance the socio-economic development, but, at the same time, may undermine the military power that maintains keeps its dominance in the international arena.

We can list four intervening factors in the relationship between prolonged peace and policy outcomes in Brazil. First, the prolonged peace changed the threat perceptions of the ruling elite, and the political scene brought the elites who are more interested in economics concerns, rather than world politics. Second, the security environment in the region did not generate the opportunist conditions for Brazil to be more assertive. Generally, Latin America has been unassertive in projecting any importance in the global system beyond economics, and posed no threat to nation-states dominating the international politics. Third, absence of a robust external threat limited the scope and the cohesion of the state in Brazil. Along with a narrower scope and lesser levels of state cohesion, Brazil hindered the success of their influence strategies. Finally, the peaceful environment helped Brazil to get rid of its security dilemma with its neighbor Argentine, and gave way to a fast economic development without heavy military expenses. However, abandoning the nuclear armament, and advanced military technologies due to the needlessness of a strong military force deprived Brazil of a strong policy tool in the world politic: hard power.

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